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1. Introduction 
It is widely assumed that a common currency makes it desirable to have also a common 
fiscal policy (and some go even so far as saying as the euro needs to be backed up by a 
political union).
1 However, this is not a foregone conclusion if one accepts that fiscal 
policy can also be a source of shocks. There are a variety of reasons why fiscal policy 
could be destabilizing: policy makers do not have full control over the outcome, at times 
the effect of a certain measure (e.g. a tax reform) is quite different from what is 
anticipated; or the economic forecasts underlying fiscal policy might turn out to be 
wrong. In the following it is thus assumed that fiscal policy represents a source of shocks. 
The key question then is whether a higher correlation of these shocks (presumably 
because of tighter cooperation) is desirable. The simple answer is that in general it might 
be better to have independent national fiscal policies that are not coordinated because this 
leads to risk diversification: the variance of a sum of shocks falls with the covariance 
among the individual components. 
2. The model 
The key idea is illustrated in the following simplified model of a two-country monetary 
union: 
yt =− α it
e + fft +β yt* (1) 
yt* =− α it
e + fft* +β *yt (2) 
mt
e=φ yt + (1−φ)yt* −δ
–1it
e (3) 
                                                          
1 For a survey on the first issue see, for instance, de Grauwe (2005, pp. 220 ff.), and Gandolfo (2001, pp. 
344 ff.). For an introduction into the second aspect see Gros and Thygesen (1998, pp. 545 ff.). 5
where, as usual, yt stands for income, fft stands for a fiscal policy demand shock.  A 
starred variable, as usual, refers to the foreign country (or the rest of the monetary union). 
The parameters β and β* designate the marginal propensities to import from the partner 
country. 
The money supply, mt, and the interest rate, it, have the superscript e (euro area) because 
in a common currency area there is only one interest rate and one monetary policy. 
Equations (1) and (2) represent conventional IS curves. δ stands for the inverse of the 
interest elasticity of money demand. φ and (1−φ) are the weights of the two countries in 
the overall EMU-wide money demand (presumably related to their economic weights). 
Complete centralization of fiscal policies, for instance, does two things. One is that the 
discretionary part of fiscal policies is fully and positively correlated (e.g. the central 
government decides to raise taxes for the union as a whole). However, the centralized budget 
also has an important built-in stabilizer (an endogenous component), i.e. it allows for 
automatic transfers from the region experiencing good economic times to the region 
experiencing bad economic times. This is the well-known built-in insurance mechanism 
against asymmetric shocks provided by a central budget. This means that a centralized budget 
also makes it possible that the implicit regional budget deficits (surpluses) get negatively
correlated. This tends to reduce the variance of output. Our model does allow for this effect 
to play a role. It has two components in the fiscal policy shocks, one which is discretionary 
(here meant to be an error in the fiscal policy stance) and one which is dependent on the 
income levels of the two regions.  
For this purpose, we assume here that fft consists partially of a pure fiscal shock (ft) and 
an automatic stabiliser equal to y , where   represents the elasticity of the budget (deficit) 
to growth (this parameter is assumed for simplicity to be equal in both countries).  6
Defining    =      θ −  and 
  
      θ − =  allows us to rewrite equations (1) and (2) as 
follows:   
yt =− α it
e + ft -  yt +β yt*  or  yt= (1+ )
-1  [−αit
e + ft +β yt* ]  (1a) 
yt* =− α it
e + ft* -  y* +β *yt  or yt* =  (1+ )
-1  [−αit
e + ft* +β
∗yt]( 2 a )  
It is apparent from these two equations that in the presence of automatic stabilisers ( >0) 
any shock to demand will have a smaller impact on output because its direct impact will 
automatically be reduced by (1+ )
-1.
What are the ‘spillover’ effects of demand shocks (e.g. fiscal policy) in this simplified 
environment? This can be found by solving the model for income in both countries. 
Using equation (3) in equation (2a) yields:   
yt*[1 + + θ αδ(1−φ)] = (β* − αδφ)yt +α δ mt
e + ft* (4) 
Using equation (3) in equation (1a) yields, mutatis mutandis, a similar equation for the 
home country. The solution for home income is then: 
yt[1 + + θ αδφ] = (β−α δ (1−φ))yt* +α δ mt
e + ft (5) 
Substituting out foreign income yields a more complicated expression which contains 
only yt:
yt[1 + + θ αδφ] =α δ mt
e + ft + [β−α δ (1−φ)][1 + + θ αδ(1−φ)]
−1
 [(β* − αδφ)yt +α δ mt
e + ft*]   (6) 
This can be solved to yield:  7
[] [ ] { }
          

  
          
φ αδ θ β αδφ θ β ββ θ
αδ θ β φ αδ β φ αδ θ
− + + + + + + − +










Or somewhat simplified:   
[] [ ] { }
∆










αδ θ β φ αδ β φ αδ θ           
       (7)
This equation implies that the effect of a positive demand shock abroad on the home 
country’s income could be either negative or positive depending on the sign of the 
expression in square brackets that multiplies ft*. Given that the denominator of this 
expression ∆ is positive, the spillover effects are positive only if the direct demand 
effect, β, is larger than the interest-rate effect, αδ(1−φ). If these two effects are equal, 
there is no spillover. The relative strength of the interest-rate effect depends on the size of 
the foreign country (or rest of EMU), (1−φ), multiplied by the product of the inverse of 
the interest elasticity of money demand (δ) and the elasticity of final demand with respect 
to the interest rate (α).
The existence of automatic stabilisers ( >0) does not affect the sign of the spillover effect 
because ∆ is positive and growing in  .  However, the magnitude of the spillovers is 
affected by automatic stabilisers: an increase in the strength of automatic stabilisers (rise 
in  ) weakens the spillover effect.  
Does the sign of the spillover effect depend on country size?  For a country that is only a 
small part of EMU (φ small),  β (the marginal propensity to import from the rest of the 
EMU) is likely to be large. This implies that the two parameters whose difference 
determines the sign of the spillover effect (  and (1−φ)) should vary in the same direction 
with changes in country size. Hence there is no simple presumption that the spillover 8
effect changes sign with country size. However, there are in reality large differences even 
among EU-15 member countries (and even more among the new members) in terms of 
their trade integration with the euro zone. Hence, the probability that the spillover effects 
are positive should be higher for countries that for reason of geography (or specialization 
in particular products) trade more with the euro zone, i.e. have a higher β (e.g. Belgium 
versus Greece). The absolute value of the spillover effect is also influenced by the 
multiplier in the denominator, which is always positive since β, β* < 1, and which is 
increasing or decreasing in β depending on the size of the spillover effect. 
The effect of the demand shocks in equation (7) is implicitly based on the assumption 
that the Union-wide money supply is held constant. This would correspond to money 
supply targeting by the ECB along the lines of that of the Bundesbank. If the ECB 
targeted interest rates, the spillover effect would of course be positive, since there would 
be no offsetting impact from higher rates. However, in this latter case there would be 
pressure on prices to rise throughout the euro area. Thus, it is likely that the ECB will 
increase interest rates if fiscal policy becomes expansionary even if it does not have a 
formal money supply target (only a reference value). 9
3. Spillover effects and the desirability of fiscal policy coordination 
In this simplified model one can now calculate how the variability of home country 
output is affected by the variance of the home and foreign demand shock, as well as their 
covariance.  
For simplicity it is assumed that both shocks are distributed normally with standard 
deviation σ (and 
∗ σ ) and covariance covariance(f, f*).
The variance of domestic output is then given by: 
() [] [ ] {            	
 σ φ αδ β σ φ αδ θ 2 2
t
y − − + − + + − ∆ = 
      [] [ ] }    
           	 φ αδ β φ αδ θ − − − + + +        (8) 
Assuming that the two countries have the same likelihood to make errors in their fiscal 
policy, the two standard deviations should be equal. The key element in this expression is 
then the sign and size of the covariance and the product which pre-multiplies this 
covariance, i.e. [] [ ]        φ αδ β φ αδ θ − − − + + . If the spillover effects of demand shocks 
are positive, i.e. if the second expression in square brackets is positive, a high (positive) 
covariance between foreign and domestic shocks will mean a high variance of domestic 
output. It follows that (in a common monetary area) the variance of income increases 
with the degree of correlation of fiscal shocks.  Again, the existence of automatic 
stabilisers will not affect the sign of the crucial term, but only its size. If the sign of the 
spillover effects changes, this conclusion would also change. If spillover effects of 
demand shocks are negative, a low variance of domestic output would be the result. 
Whether more coordination of fiscal policy is desirable thus depends crucially on the 
spillover effects fiscal policy has. For instance, some calculations of the welfare gains 10
from international policy coordination among the G3 show that the gains from policy 
coordination are ambiguous.
2  We would argue that the cross-country spillovers among 
member countries under EMU should in general be more likely to be positive given the 
high (and increasing) degree of intra-EMU trade.  However, this cannot be taken for 
granted.   
De Haan, Eijffinger and Waller (2005), for instance, have discussed the issue of 
centralization or decentralization including the risks of decentralization and the diverging 
business cycles and, hence, negative spillover effects, in EMU quite extensively.
3 Their 
main conclusion is that here is still quite some evidence which suggests that, within the 
euro area, countries diverge in terms of their business cycles. There is also only mixed 
evidence that further integration will lead to more synchronization of business cycles. 
This is especially valid with an eye on Eastern EMU enlargement. However, potential 
policy conclusions are conditional on the correlation between home and foreign demand 
shocks (and possibly supply shocks) and, hence, on the degree of business cycle 
synchronization. Seen on the whole, thus, there remains considerable uncertainty about 
one key element that would be necessary for fiscal policy coordination, namely the sign 
and size of the spillover effects. 
It is difficult to decide whether in reality there is too much or too little fiscal policy 
coordination, or synchronization in the euro area so far because too little data are 
available.  Table 1 below shows the variability (standard deviation) and the correlation 
coefficients of the national cyclically adjusted deficits (which should correspond to the 
                                                          
2 As an early source, see Frankel and Rockett (1988) on coordination between the US and the rest of the 
world. 
3 See de Haan, Eijffinger and Waller (2005), Chapter 5. 11
variable f in our model) with that of the euro area. For the calculation of the correlation 
coefficients, we excluded the country under consideration from the euro area average.  
We differentiate between two periods – a pre-EMU period ranging from 1985 to 1997 
and an EMU sample from 1998 to 2007. Data are from the AMECO data base (Cyclically 
adjusted net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) of general government: adjustment based on 
trend GDP excessive deficit procedure). 
There is considerable variability in the data and little systematic difference between pre- 
and post EMU. Comparing the two periods, the average degree of variability decreases 
slightly from 1.15 to 0.77. But this is not statistically significant given the small sample 
size.  Moreover, the average of the correlation coefficients is roughly constant: 28.08 and 
26.76. There is a positive but weak correlation and if there is now some coordination in 
the fiscal policies it is not new as it was at nearly the same level already before. This 
suggests that since the start of EMU the discretionary part of fiscal policy has not been 
highly synchronized.   12
Table 1: Variability and co-variation of fiscal policy in the euro area (as measured by the 























































































































The simple model used here just serves to illustrate a general idea, which should hold up 
in more sophisticated models as well. Our main result is that in general it might be better 
to have independent national fiscal policies that are not coordinated (or at least not 
correlated) under EMU, because this leads to risk diversification: the variance of a sum of 
shocks is lower the lower the covariance among the individual components. The 
argument that independent national fiscal policies are preferable because of risk 
diversification is not new and was already documented in the risk sharing literature by 13
Sørensen, Yosha, van Wincoop and many others.
4 However, our simple model supports 
this view from another new angle. 
Our analytical results suggest that the calls for fiscal policy coordination that are often 
repeated might be misguided.  More fiscal policy coordination is also likely to lead to 
more correlated fiscal policy shocks and this might increase actual output variability. 
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